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ABSTRACT 
 
Questo elaborato scritto tratta dei mercati online, quali, ad esempio, eBay, Aliexpress, 
Taobao e Airbnb, e in particolare del problema delle asimmetrie informative che 
caratterizza questo tipo di mercati. Gli e-markets sono piattaforme in cui compratori e 
venditori che provengono da tutto il mondo possono interagire tra di loro attraverso 
transazioni a due parti. In questo contesto, coloro che si occupano di progettare e 
regolamentare queste piattaforme devono cercare di mitigare il rischio di comportamenti 
opportunistici e promuovere la fiducia e la collaborazione tra i vari utenti. 
Vi sono vari strumenti che i mercati online utilizzano per raggiungere questi obiettivi, ad 
esempio le certificazioni di qualità ai venditori e l’utilizzo degli “user generated 
contents”, ovvero i contenuti quali i commenti, i feedback e le recensioni che gli utenti 
lasciano sulla piattaforma una volta concluso un acquisto. 
Questo scritto offre un quadro generale delle politiche più significative ed efficaci 
implementate dai mercati online e esplora in dettaglio, attraverso la raccolta di studi 
empirici, gli effetti economici e comportamentali dell’implementazione di tali 
meccanismi, sia sulle imprese che sui consumatori. 
A conclusione dell’elaborato è presente una mia riflessione, fatta alla luce di tutto ciò che 
viene presentato di seguito, su come un’ipotetica autorità antitrust potrebbe redigere una 
regolamentazione valida per tutti i mercati online che possa consentire ai consumatori di 
mantenere, almeno in parte, il proprio surplus, e di poter contare su venditori di qualità 
anche in questo tipo di mercati in cui il rischio di comportamenti opportunistici è molto 
elevato.   
 4 
      INTRODUCTION 
 
Today online marketplaces are widespread and have been defined as one of the greatest 
success of the internet over the past two decades. They usually consist of e-platforms in 
which sellers and buyers can interact between them in order to trade goods and services. 
These platforms can be a great vehicle for firms which want to expand their business or 
to sell out their inventories fast, but also for consumers who want to buy specific goods 
that can be found only in other countries or that are rare to find in physical stores. 
Every single online marketplace is focused on some product (or service) categories. 
Actually, the main categories on which platforms focus are: Food & beverage, 
Homeware, Health & beauty, Clothing and accessories, Toys and games, Electrical 
appliances, Books, Games & consoles and Sports. On the one hand, Amazon.com, the 
biggest global online platform, with 304 millions of active users, offers a very wide range 
of product categories, but, for example, Airbnb, one of the most successful marketplaces 
for lodging and house rentals, with 150 millions of active users, focuses only on this 
specific sector. 
Globally, more than 50% of ecommerce sales were made through online marketplaces in 
2018, and that is forecast to grow to about two-thirds within five years. 
Following there’s a list of the major 5 generic online marketplaces which offer nearly all 
the product categories I’ve mentioned before; apart from Mercado Libre, which is 
characteristic of the South America, the other are global platforms. 
In the third column of the table is showed the average number of visits per months; data 
are updated at February 2019. 
 
Name Region Visits per month 
   
Amazon Global 4,6 billions 
eBay Global  1,8 billions 
Aliexpress Global  865,2 millions 
Mercado Libre South America  634,7 millions 
Rakuten Global 384,9 millions 
 
The list of e-markets that actually exist all over the world is really long: according to 
Webretailer.com, they are 146. In 2017, retail e-commerce sales worldwide amounted to 
2.3 trillion US dollars and e-retail revenues are projected to grow to 4.88 trillion US 
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dollars in 2021, moreover, the electronic commerce is expected to cover a share of 17,5% 
of sales of the global retail commerce in 2021. 
In designing online marketplaces, there are some typical problems that must be taken into 
account. The biggest issue is the fact that, unlike in a physical transaction in a store, where 
the buyer can touch and feel the good he or she is buying, this close contact is absent in 
electronic commerce (Tadelis 2016). Therefore, marketplace designers have to adopt 
mechanisms which can ensure trust among buyers and sellers. Trust in online 
marketplaces means that consumers and sellers can act in two-sided transactions with no 
risks of opportunistic behaviours, gaining each one their own surplus when the transaction 
has occurred. 
In this paper I will illustrate in detail the most relevant issues affecting online 
marketplaces and I will examine the mechanisms that platform designers have adopted, 
with the aim of guaranteeing trust among users. 
 
In the remaining of this study, Section 1 presents the theory behind the risk of 
opportunistic behaviours in marketplaces, Section 2 offers an overview of the most 
common and successful reputation mechanisms adopted by platforms and examine 
through empirical analysis the economic and behavioural consequences of these 
mechanisms, exploring also the problem of rating biases. Section 3 concludes the paper, 
offering some ideas to an antitrust institution that is interested in the issue of trust in online 
trades, about designing a set of rules that will help consumers to be protected from 
opportunistic behaviours. 
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 1. THEORY BEHIND REPUTATION MECHANISMS 
 
1.1 – MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION 
 
The main concept behind the risk of opportunistic behaviours in transactions is the one 
of information asymmetry. Information asymmetry occurs when one of the two parts of 
a transaction has more or better information than the other. 
This can happen when one of the two parts knows something about the item traded that 
the other part doesn’t know, or instead it knows something about the other part, while the 
latter doesn’t. 
 
The two main forms of information asymmetry are the concepts of adverse selection and 
moral hazard; they are relevant for our study because they actually affect the vast majority 
of transactions in e-markets. 
Adverse selection occurs when one of the two parts (usually the seller) has more 
information than the other on the item traded. This is obviously an advantage for the 
former, that can set the price for the good or service knowing that the other part, due to 
the lack of information, may accept that price also when is too high if compared to the 
effective quality of the product. 
The concept of adverse selection is well explained by George Akerlof (1970) in his work 
"The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism". In the 
American slang, the world “lemon” defines a car that it is found to be a bad quality one 
only after it has been bought. In his paper, Akerlof in fact studies the concept of 
information asymmetry applied to the market for used cars.  
Suppose that, in this specific market, two types of cars are sold: high-quality cars and 
low-quality cars; sellers know, for each of their cars, if they are high or low quality, but 
consumers can’t know that, because of information asymmetry. 
So, there’s a risk of opportunistic behaviour by the sellers, that can sell low-quality cars 
(lemons) at the price of an high quality car. This is, in practice, the concept of adverse 
selection. 
In his work, Akerlof then shows that this market setting, characterised by the adverse 
selection problem, can lead to the failure of the market, with consumers that, because of 
the fear of buying a bad car at the price of a good one, are willing to pay a maximum price 
equal to the price of lemons. The result is that only low-quality cars are sold in the market. 
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“It has been seen that the good cars may be driven out of the market by the lemons. But 
in a more continuous case with different grades of goods, even worse pathologies can 
exist. For it is quite possible to have the bad driving out the not-so-bad driving out the 
medium driving out the not-so-good driving out the good in such a sequence of events 
that no market exists at all.” (Akerlof 1970, p.490) 
 
Moral hazard is the situation in which one of the two parts of a transaction, after it has 
agreed to the contract, changes its behaviour in order to gain more benefits, taking 
advantage of the fact that the other part can’t do nothing to prove its unfair behaviour.  
The typical setting in which moral hazard can take place is the insurance sector. Insurance 
contracts are situations in which one of the two parts, the insurance company, in change 
of regular payments, takes responsibility for all the economic risks linked to the 
“hazardous behaviours” of the insured. 
An individual, in general, pays a lot of attention to avoid behaviours that can deal damage 
to other people or things, if the risk of dealing that damage is (at least partly) in charge of 
him. So, when an insurance company takes responsibility for the damage that an 
individual can deal, the latter pays less attention to its “hazardous behaviours” and this 
because it is very difficult for the insurance company to monitor its customer’s actions 
and verify its unfair behaviour. This is a practical example of moral hazard. 
 
Following Tadelis (2016) we escribe now a couple of examples highlighting asymmetric 
information issues in online markets. First, let’s consider a seller on eBay: suppose that 
this seller knows that the good it’s offering it’s defective and that he chooses not to reveal 
the defect. In this case we have an adverse selection problem, because the seller knows 
something more about the object of the transaction than the buyer. 
Suppose now that the seller, instead of selling a defective item, sells an high-quality item 
but, once the transaction has been completed, it chooses to skimp on the wrapping 
material used for the item’s delivery, increasing the likelihood that the good arrives 
damaged. This is an example of moral hazard in e-markets. 
 
These examples show that in online marketplaces quality uncertainty is a very common 
problem, given the usual incomplete information settings in which agents operate: “For a 
marketplace to flourish, therefore, it is necessary that both sides of the market feel 
comfortable trusting each other, and for that, they need to have safeguards that alleviate 
that problems caused by asymmetric information” (Tadelis 2016, p. 2).  
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1.2 – THE TRUST GAME MODEL 
  
The difficulty in supporting anonymous online trade can be easily explained using a 
simple game theoretic example, which is a version of the “trust game”. 
Trust game is a game theory model in which two players, in each stage of the game, have 
to choose if to honor trust, or instead to abuse trust. Following Tadelis (2016), we describe 
a simple trust game. 
In an online marketplace where the two players are a seller and a buyer, the buyer finds 
an item listed online by the anonymous seller at a price of 30. Imagine that the buyer 
values the product at 50 (the net surplus for the buyer is 20) and that the seller has no 
alternative use of the good, implying that if it doesn’t sell the item it will gain a profit of 
0. 
Shipping and handling expenses cost a total of 10 to the seller, meaning that at a price of 
30, it gains a net surplus of 20. 
Now suppose that the seller can be of two types: an honest seller, who will always honor 
trust and will ship the item once the transaction has been completed, or an opportunistic 
seller, who will maximize its net profit. 
In an anonymous marketplace, the buyer doesn’t know which type the seller is, but it 
knows that it is an honest seller with a probability ρ ∈ (0,1). 
In this game model we have both adverse selection (the type of seller is known only by 
the seller) and moral hazard (the choice of the opportunistic seller is not controllable by 
the buyer). 
 
Imagine that the game is played only once: in this case an opportunistic seller will always 
abuse trust, choosing not to ship the item and gaining a total profit of 30 instead of 20; 
so, the buyer will trust and buy only if the expected benefit for either getting 20 of surplus 
or losing 30 is not negative:  
 
20 ρ + (-30)(1- ρ) ≥ 0    à  ρ ≥ 0,6.  
 
But if the game is played more than once, the opportunistic seller may have incentive to 
honor trust, and this choice is based on how much it values future rewards. 
Suppose that the seller discounts future payoffs at a discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). 
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We also have to take into account that with a multiple stage game, the buyer can use the 
seller’s behaviour in the first transaction as a proxy to identify the type of seller. This 
means that, if the seller has abused trust in the previous transaction, the buyer would not 
trust it anymore, nullifying future rewards for the seller.  
“Equipped with these beliefs, if future is important enough, then an opportunistic seller 
would not find in its best interests to abuse trust in the first transaction”. (Tadelis 2016, 
p.5) 
 
So, assuming we are in a two-stage game and that the buyer too uses δ as discount factor, 
it will be happy trusting the seller only if: 
 ρ (20 + 20𝛿) + (1 − 𝜌)(−30)     à  ρ ≥ ./0/12/3 , 
 
If:                                                      𝛿 ≈ 1   à ρ ≥ 0,4. 
 
The result shows that as δ approaches to 1, the likelihood that the buyer will trust the 
seller is higher, in the sense that the former will be happy to transact also for lower values 
of 𝜌. 
With more stages than two, this effect is larger, and trade will occur also for much lower 
values of ρ. 
 
The key idea here is that actions of sellers will lead to future consequences that will affect 
their future payoffs; as Tadelis (2016) affirms, if the performance of sellers will be shown 
not only to single buyers but to all buyers in the platform, in a sort of “transaction history”, 
the reputation of the seller (to be an honest-type or not) will be clear to all potential buyers, 
and this may be a great incentive for sellers to behave well. 
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2. ECONOMIC AND BEHAVIOURAL CONSEQUENCES OF REPUTATION 
MECHANISMS IN ONLINE MARKETPLACES 
 
2.1 – FEEDBACK SYSTEMS AND ONLINE REVIEWS 
 
Two types of mechanisms are usually used to create a transaction history of sellers and 
to provide future buyers a portrait that can help them deciding if to trust a seller or not. 
 
The so called feedback systems are standardized processes designed by marketplaces that 
allow users (both buyers and sellers in a two-sided feedback system) to leave comments, 
usually in form of a “star rating” about the seller’s (buyer’s) performance and behaviour 
in the transacting and delivering phase. 
Online reviews are instead comments and valuations, created by buyers, about the items 
traded in the marketplace, not dealing with the buying experience. They contribute to 
create a seller’s past reputation focusing on quality of products or services which the latter 
offer. 
 
2.1.1 – EWOM AND USER GENERATED CONTENT, AN OVERVIEW 
 
Word-of-mouth (WOM) is defined as oral, person-to-person communication between a 
receiver and a communicator, whom the receiver perceives as non-commercial, regarding 
a brand, product, or service. 
The Internet has enabled new forms of communication platforms that further empower 
both providers and consumers, allowing a vehicle for the sharing of information and 
opinions both from business to consumer, and from consumer to consumer. EWOM 
(electronic Word-of-mouth) refers to any positive or negative statement made by 
potential, actual, or former customers about a product or company, which is made 
available to a multitude of people and institution (Yang, Li et al. 2016, p. 272). 
 
According to Tadelis (2018) and King et al. (2014) the great success of eWOM today is 
due to the possibility for users to maintain anonymity, a fact that make them more 
comfortably in making their opinions public, and to the great pervasiveness of this type 
of UGCs (User Generated Contents); through eWOM in fact, opinions become available 
to a much larger audience and for a much longer time.  
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Before online feedback and reviews systems were introduced, people were highly 
skeptical about their adoption by marketplaces, as mentioned also by Jeff Bezos (CEO of 
Amazon) in his “Letter to stakeholders” in 2003. This skepticism was supported also by 
the economic theory: in fact leaving a feedback or a review supplies a public good and 
we know that, because of the free riding problem, people are not encouraged to supply 
public goods that can give benefits to other people. However, the rise of eWOM shows 
that in online marketplaces such a pro-social behaviour has become a trend; this probably 
because of factors like the possibility to maintain anonymity and so not being judged by 
others and like the possibility to become “opinion leaders” for other consumers and gain 
some moral satisfaction. Another reason for the raise of the pro-social behaviour 
mentioned above is the fact that, even if eWOM is a public good, there are no monetary 
costs (in addition to the purchase cost of the item traded) to leave a feedback or a review: 
costs exist only in terms of time and therefore it is easy to sustain.  
As Tadelis studies show, in 2016, 65% of users left feedback on eBay and in the earlier 
days of that platform, this percentage was even higher (nearly 80%). 
 
2.1.2 – TAOBAO AND THE “RFF” SYSTEM 
  
Taobao marketplace (www.taobao.com) was launched in 2003 and it has become the most 
popular Chinese consumer-to-consumer marketplace. On an average day, about 600 
millions of users visit Taobao to search for some products. (Data from 
https://www.similarweb.com/website/taobao.com)  
Taobao is part of the Alibaba group, a large Chinese public company which operates in 
the e-commerce sector, and, like eBay, Taobao intermediates between buyers and sellers, 
but unlike eBay, it doesn’t earn from charging listings or from commission fees, it gains 
from advertising and other services that the platform provides to users.  
In the present analysis I will treat Taobao separately from other marketplaces because of 
its particular feedback system, called “Reward-for-feedback” (RFF). 
The RFF system was introduced in 2012, and it consists in a feedback mechanism in 
which sellers can set, for each item they sell, a rebate amount, in form of cash or a store 
coupon, as a reward for a buyer’s feedback (review) after purchasing the item. If the seller 
chooses the RFF feature, the rewards for feedbacks are given only to those customers 
who leave high-quality reviews. The quality of reviews doesn’t depend on whether they 
are favorable or not, but it is determined by a machine learning algorithm that examines 
feedback’s content and length, finding if the key features of the item are mentioned.  
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The introduction of this feedback system was based on the economic theory, which 
predicted that the RFF system would have improved the overall quality in the 
marketplace. 
Nelson (1970) was the first to introduce the concepts of experience goods and search 
goods: an experience good is a product or service where product characteristics are 
difficult to observe in advance, but this characteristics can be ascertained upon 
consumption; a search good is a product or service which characteristics can be easily 
evaluated before purchase. The economic literature has established a theory for which the 
adverse selection problem concerning experience goods can be solved through 
advertising: only high quality sellers will spend money to promote their experience goods, 
because only high quality sellers can be confident that they will receive positive returns 
for their expenditures.  
So, advertising would act as a signaling device, attracting buyers towards high quality 
sellers; therefore, on Taobao, only high quality sellers will adopt the RFF feature and 
reward buyers for their feedbacks, because, like in the advertising case, only high quality 
sellers will gain from their expenditures; in this sense RFF acts as a signaling device. 
Li et al. (2018) studied the implications of this RFF mechanism, using data from 
transactions that involved 13018 randomly selected sellers on Taobao between September 
2012 and February 2013, in four product categories: cell phones, memory cards, 
cosmetics masks and jeans. They found out a confirm to the RFF-as-signal theory. 
In fact, their results showed that high quality sellers use the reward-for-feedback feature 
to send signals to customers, and the latter respond rationally to these signals: sales of an 
item are 30% higher when the seller chooses to adopt RFF.  
The RFF also help new sellers to solve the “cold start” problem: it is normally difficult 
for a seller with no feedback history to show that it is an high quality one, but adoption 
of RFF is an immediate and effective signal to buyers, that creates reputation faster.  
Furthermore, people now are paid to supply feedbacks, that are public goods, so they are 
obviously encouraged to post more reviews and also to spend more time on writing them, 
resulting in more detailed and complete product reviews.  
 
 
2.1.3 – TWO-SIDED VS ONE-SIDED FEEDBACK, THE RETALIATION PROBLEM 
 
Analyzing feedback systems of online marketplaces, we have to distinguish between 
“two-sided” and “one-sided” feedback systems. The former are mechanisms in which, 
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after a buyer and a seller have completed a transaction, both of them can leave feedback 
to each other. The latter instead are mechanisms in which only buyers can leave feedback 
to sellers after the completion of a transaction. 
Before 2008, eBay feedback system was of a “two-sided” type, but then the platform 
decided to switch to a “one-sided” system; why eBay decided to make this change? 
In the earlier days of eBay, payments were made through checks or money orders to 
sellers, and these payments methods made it clear that also sellers had to decide if to trust 
or not buyers, because also the latter could, referring to the trust game we analyzed in the 
previous section, “behave bad” and do not send the payment to the seller. 
Then, in 2002, eBay acquired Paypal, the famous online payment system, making the 
problem of buyers not paying all but disappeared; this obviously made feedback from 
sellers less useful. 
However, the reason of the switch to the “one-sided” system lies in the so called 
retaliation problem. The general definition of retaliation is the act of responding with an 
harmful action to someone who hurt us with an harmful action too. 
Bolton et al. (2013), using data from eBay in the period of the “two-sided” feedbacks, 
show in their studies that sellers, before giving feedback to buyers, waited to get feedback 
from them. Let’s consider a simple model in which a buyer (B) and a seller (S) have 
completed a transaction; the transaction then will end with the feedback setting (FB,FS), 
where FB is the feedback from the buyer and FS is the feedback from the seller. Both FB 
and FS can be a negative feedback (-), or a positive one (+). Bolton et al. (2013) show 
that practically all transactions ended with (+,+) or (-,-) and then the authors show that 
the vast majority of (-,-) transactions were characterized by the seller leaving feedback on 
the same day or the day after the buyer did, while the (+,+) transactions happened with 
less correlation between the buyer’s and the seller’s day of leaving feedback. 
Hence, as Tadelis (2016) states, seller’s negative feedback scores were primarily 
retaliatory, which in turn made it painful for buyers to leave negative feedback. 
So, today it’s generally accepted that “one-sided” feedback systems, combined with 
online instant payments methods, can avoid opportunistic behaviours from buyers and 
can also avoid the retaliation problem, but this statement it’s not true for all online 
marketplaces.  
In fact, if we consider a platform for lodging and house rentals like Airbnb, it’s not true 
that the best feedback system is of a “one-sided” type. In this type of marketplaces, 
owners can mispresent the home they are renting, leave it dirty, not give renters the key 
at a specific time and more, but also renters can leave the home damaged or dirty, disturb 
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neighbours, and behave opportunistically in the period of their sojourn. So, in this setting, 
both the owner and the host "performance/behavior" matter, way more than the     
"performance/behavior" of the consumers on eBay or Amazon. So it is relevant to leave 
a feedback on the host too. For this moral hazard problem affecting both the two parts of 
the transactions, here it’s preferable to adopt a “two-sided” feedback system. 
“Each marketplace, therefore, must weigh the cost and benefits from one- versus two-
sided feedback systems”. (Tadelis 2016, p.13) 
 
 
 
 
2.1.4 – CONSEQUENCES OF ONLINE REVIEWS ON FIRM’S ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE  
 
“By bridging the informational gap between buyers and sellers, online user reviews can 
help make a product worth purchasing.” (Tadelis 2018, p.5) 
This statement can help us realizing that online product reviews have become a 
fundamental tool not only for buyers who want to know more about the effective quality 
of goods and services offered in marketplaces, but also for firms, because a lot of studies 
on this topic have demonstrated that online user reviews impact the economic 
performance of sellers, in terms of sales. 
The two relevant dimensions of online reviews are volume and valence; volume is the 
number or reviews that a product detains, valence instead is defined as the average rating 
of those reviews. The studies of Chen et al. (2004) and Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) are 
the first that had investigated the relationship between online reviews and product sales; 
they showed, analyzing data from Amazon and Barnes and Noble online bookstores, that 
valence and volume of reviews were always positively correlated with sales. Dellarocas 
et al. (2007) and Liu (2006) used in their studies data from Yahoo movies, an online 
marketplace for movies, and found that, in the movie industry, ratings per se do not affect 
sales directly, but they do through volume. The relationship went also in the opposite 
direction for the movie industry: higher sales led to an higher volume of reviews; in this 
case, valence doesn’t play a large role. 
Exploring the value of valence, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) had found that negative 
reviews have a much larger impact on sales than positive reviews. Regarding valence of 
the content (and not of the rating score) of reviews, Cui et al. (2010) found out that 
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reviews with a negative content might even have a positive impact on sales, as long as 
the average user rating is positive, because they raise product awareness among 
consumers.   
Some studies have been carried also on the impact on sales of another dimension of online 
reviews: the variance, that can be defined as how much valence of reviews vary from its 
average value, for a specific item. About that, Clemons (2006), analyzing data from the 
craft beer industry, shows that variance, in markets for hyperdifferentiated products, has 
an even larger role than valence in affecting sales: the higher the variance in the ratings, 
the more negative the impact on sales. However, apart from the context of 
hyperdifferentiated and niche markets, variance seems not to have a relevant role. 
Online user reviews are characterized also by the fact that they (usually) embody a textual 
content. Ghose and Ipeirotis (2011), investigated the impact of textual content of reviews 
on the economic performance of sellers and found, using text mining techniques on 
Amazon product reviews, that if a review was characterized by subjectivity, the impact 
on sales was positive for search goods; for experience goods, the correlation between 
subjectivity and sales was not clear, but Ghose and Ipeirotis (2011) showed that sales for 
these goods were affected negatively by the proportion of spelling mistakes. 
In sum, online user reviews affect sales in different ways, and through different 
dimensions: the most important “drivers” of sales are volume and valence of reviews, 
which positively affect sales for nearly all types of markets, instead variance drives sales 
only in niche markets. It has been found out that also textual content of reviews affects 
firm’s economic performance, but research on this aspect is still new and the only results 
show that this dimension of reviews affects in different ways experience goods and search 
goods. 
Now, let’s examine the studies that investigated how firms incorporate eWOM into their 
marketing strategies, in particular in their pricing decisions. Using data from Shopzilla, a 
shopping comparison website, Grover et al. (2016) showed that a greater variance in 
ratings, which means a more heterogeneous consumer willingness to pay for the same 
good, leads sellers to raise prices. 
Yacouel and Fleischer (2012) were interested in studying how feedbacks posted on 
Online Travel Agencies impact the price decisions of hotels; they analyzed data from 
Bookings (the actual Booking.com) and found out that if reviews signaled an high quality, 
firms seems to be allowed to ask for a premium price. One interesting result concerning 
hotels on Bookings was that when hotels gained high scores even just in the rating of the 
staff performance, they charged higher prices. An exception to the positive correlation 
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between high quality signaled by reviews and higher prices charged by sellers was found 
by Kocas and Akkan (2016), who considered data from Amazon bookstore and 
demonstrated that in this specific market, booksellers charged lower prices when the 
average quality was higher. Kocas and Akkan explained this result stating that a lower 
price combined with high ratings can help patronize customers. 
 
 
2.1.5 – CONSEQUENCES OF ONLINE USER REVIEWS ON CONSUMERS’ 
BEHAVIOUR 
 
The “funnel metaphor” that the traditional marketing literature had adopted to describe 
the consumers’ decision-making process, has been challenged by the “Consumer decision 
journey” model, theorized by McKinsey in 2009. The former model was theorized by E. 
St. Elmo Lewis in 1898 and it represents the consumer decision-making process through 
a funnel, divided in 5 parts, that starts from the awareness about a product or brand, then 
it passes through the opinion, consideration and preference phases, and finally ends with 
the purchase decision. The model of McKinsey instead provides us a view of the 
consumer in which it is constantly exposed to advertisement, recommendations and other 
marketing activities, and, during its decision making process, it may add or subtract 
brands at any time. In fact, today, consumers, as De Langhe et al. (2016) state, are 
empowered agents, as they can share opinions with a larger audience and become active 
users evaluating their experience with products and informing others. In the era of 
eWOM, therefore, firms have to take into account that consumers are not as “loyal” to 
the brand as they were in the past, because they finally can compare various products 
without excessive search costs, and they have access to the opinions of customers that 
already purchased the product they are looking for. Hence, reviews has also an impact on 
the behaviour of consumers, considering both the purchasing phase and the rating phase 
itself. 
Chatterjee (2001) studied the different effects of online reviews on two types of 
consumers: consumers that are familiar with a specific e-retailer and consumers who 
instead were attracted by lower prices. Through a laboratory experiment, in which he 
divided the two groups and analyzed their behaviour in the browsing and purchasing 
phase, he was able to show that the former are less likely to search for peers’ opinions, 
while the latter are more influenced, in making their purchase-choices, by eWOM. Results 
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of Chatterjee (2001) demonstrate that the “lowest price” advertising strategy is not so 
profitable, because it attracts the less-loyal type of consumers. 
Vermeulen and Seegers (2009), by means of a laboratory experiment, analyzed the effect 
of the exposure to online reviews on hotel awareness, attitude and consideration. 
Their results showed that both positive and negative reviews increase awareness; attitude 
to the hotel instead was improved by positive reviews and worsen by negative reviews. 
Interestingly, consideration was not affected by negative reviews, because, as the authors 
suggest, the positive effect on awareness was high enough to compensate the negative 
effect on consideration. In line with the studies of Chatterjee (2001), the two authors 
showed that familiarity with the hotel makes consumers less willing to rely on eWOM, 
while lesser known hotels were more susceptible to online reviews. Studies of Forman et 
al. (2008), using a dataset based on ratings and reviewers characteristics from Amazon, 
found that people are more willing to rely to online reviews when the platform provides 
some information about the identity of reviewers. “Community members process 
information heuristically, using source of characteristics as a convenient and efficient 
heuristic device on which to base their product purchase decisions” (Forman et al. 2008, 
p. 308). Exploring the role of textual content of reviews, Hu et al. (2014) found out, using 
a sample of Amazon reviews, that ratings of reviews is usually adopted to skim through 
the many available alternatives, while textual reviews are used to actually make the 
choice.  
 
 
 
2.2 – RATING BIASES  
 
Rating biases are those phenomena in which the rating behaviour of consumers is 
influenced by other exogenous factors, and therefore, it may not correspond to the true 
valuation of a product/service/purchase experience. 
When eWOM is biased, it might lead the users of a marketplace to make inefficient 
purchase decisions. Biases in reputation of e-retailers can exist due to a “natural” 
heterogeneity of consumers, who can be more prone to submit positive (or negative) 
feedbacks, but they can exist also due to attempts of sellers to strategically manipulate 
feedbacks. The latter are cases studied by Mayzlin et al. (2014), who were able to 
demonstrate that sellers in travel sites manipulated feedbacks and reviews to compete 
with local competitors for the business of travelers. The authors showed that, in travel 
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sites in which to leave a review or feedback it was needed to have purchased a room 
through the website, the reviews seem to be less biased than in those sites in which there 
were no costs to sustain in order to leave a review. In the former, the distribution of ratings 
in fact was bunching at extreme values, probably because of fake reviews left by hotels 
to compete with rivals.   
Another example that can explain this phenomenon of bias in eWOM is the eBay’s switch 
to the one-sided feedback system in 2008, a topic covered in chapter 2.1.3 of the present 
study: before the switch, users tended to post reviews that could be not true, due to the 
fear of retaliation.  
Today, platform designers have adopted mechanisms that have made the problem of fake 
reviews by sellers all but disappeared, but rating biases due to consumers’ psychology 
continue to exist. 
 
 
2.2.2 – RATING BUBBLES  
 
Studies of Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) and Godes and Mayzlin (2004) have shown that 
online rating distributions are, typically, concentrated around extreme positive or negative 
values; in many websites, as Tadelis (2018) states, moderate ratings are almost non-
existing. This is the phenomenon of rating bubbles. 
Rating bubbles have been object of various studies, in primis by Hu et al. (2009), who 
compared the rating distributions of randomly chosen Amazon products and the rating 
distributions of the same products but in a controlled laboratory setting. The results of the 
experiment show that online ratings followed a J-shaped distribution, with ratings 
concentrated on extreme values, instead laboratory ratings were more moderate.  
The authors suggested that this “extreme-rating-trend” was due to the problem of early 
adopters enthusiasm, a topic that will be covered in the next paragraph, and to the fact 
that people tend to conform to previous ratings when they have to leave a review. 
Li and Hitt (2008) found that rating data followed a decreasing trend over time, a result 
supporting the explanations of Hu et al. (2009). 
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2.2.1 – EARLY ADOPTERS ENTHUSIASM  
 
Li and Hitt (2008) studied the phenomenon of bias in ratings, analyzing data from 
Amazon bookstore and they found out that there might exist self-selection due to 
heterogeneous consumer attitudes towards products. 
In particular, they focus on the difference in the rating behaviour of two types of 
consumers: early adopters and late-comers. The former are people who are in general 
more enthusiastic about a product, and they usually buy it almost immediately when it’s 
launched in the platform. The first reviews of the product therefore will be very positive, 
because of this early adopters enthusiasm. It’s not always true that early adopters would 
assign an high rating to the products they are enthusiastic for, but this happens very often 
in markets for items like books, videogames, films, and tv series, which are goods that 
engage customers at a more psychological level, and their perceived quality is highly 
subjective. 
Li and Hitt (2008) were able to demonstrate that this self-selection due to heterogeneous 
consumer attitudes greatly impacts consumer behaviour during browsing and these biased 
signals might push users to sub-optimal choices. A natural consequence of this early 
adopters enthusiasm is the fact that average rating of products tend to worse over time, 
because late-comers obviously would leave reviews that are less enthusiastic and positive 
than those of early reviewers. 
 
 
 
2.2.2 – ONLINE SOCIAL INFLUENCE  
 
Another explanation that the economic literature gave for the rating bubble problem is 
“online social influence”, that is defined by Cicognani et al. (2016) as the tendency to 
imitate peers during the rating phase. Analyzing social influence, Moe and Schweidel 
(2012), studied the behaviour of two types of reviewers: frequent and infrequent posters. 
The former tend to differentiate themselves and being critical when they have to review 
something, infrequent posters instead tend to be influenced by previous peers’ opinions. 
So, for these authors, rating bubbles are due to heterogeneity in the reviewer pool, and 
about that, they found another result: “individuals with either high or low postpurchase 
evaluations are more likely to contribute, whereas individuals with moderate 
postpurchase evaluations are less likely to contribute”.  
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Ma et al. (2013) focus on personal characteristics of reviewers and found out that when 
these are geographically mobile, socially connected and female, they are less likely to be 
influenced by previous reviews.  
Cicognani et al. (2016), to investigate the relationship between the level of 
familiarity/loyalty of a consumer to a brand or product and its rating behaviour, conduced 
an experiment in the accommodation industry; they found out that usual customers tend 
to be less influenced by previous ratings than other customers.   
Lee et al. (2015) studied if opinions from a generic crowd have a different impact on the 
rating behaviour of consumers than opinions from friends. To do this, the authors used 
data from a social movie-website and they found out that prior ratings from friends have 
a great impact on subsequent reviews, triggering a sort of “herding behaviour”; prior 
ratings from a generic public instead, according to Lee et al. (2015), tend to influence 
subsequent ratings only if volume of this prior ratings is high. So, results of this study 
show that if the product is largely adopted by people, future reviewers tend to imitate 
peers’ opinions, but if the product is a niche one, users tend to differentiate themselves 
from the crowd opinion. 
In conclusion, rating bubbles are a generic trend of marketplaces, though they impact 
differently generic and niche markets, and they might lead to inefficient choices in terms 
of purchase decisions, but they are really difficult to avoid, because they exist due to 
heterogeneity in the reviewers pool. Market designers can instead intervene when bias in 
ratings in due to online social influence, for example mitigating the exposure of 
consumers to prior ratings. 
 
2.3 – CERTIFICATION POLICIES  
 
Warranties, reliance on past reputation and regulated certifications by trusted institutions 
are some of the instruments that have emerged to mitigate the problem of asymmetric 
information in markets. Online platforms adopt all three, in the form of buyer protection 
policies, sellers’ reputation score, and certification badges. The latter are quality 
certification given to sellers who meet some minimum quality threshold determined by 
the marketplace (Tadelis 2019). 
For example, on eBay there exist the “TRS” badge (Top Rated Seller), on Airbnb there 
exists the “Superhost” badge and on Upworks (a freelance marketplace) there are the 
“Top Rated” freelancers. All the badges, though having different names, signal a certain 
quality threshold for a seller, a lessor or a freelancer, determined on the basis of the 
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average rating of their performance in the marketplace, therefore determined by eWOM. 
Usually, in addition to all the advantages in terms of reputation that such a badge gives 
to sellers, these gain also in terms of discounts on shipping fees or on commission fees 
and, last but not least, it is a common practice for online marketplace designers to show 
first the certified sellers, when a user is browsing for an item in the webpage. 
 
 
2.3.1 – THE EBAY CASE AND THE POLICY CHANGE OF 2009 
 
The feedback system of eBay consists on the possibility for buyers to leave a positive, 
neutral or negative feedback. We already know that before 2008 that system was two-
sided but then it became one-sided. In addition to that, buyers can also express their 
opinion in the “detailed seller rating”, a mechanism in which they can give sellers 
anonymous ratings between 1 to 5 stars along four dimensions: item as described, 
communication, shipping speed and shipping rate. 
Before 2009, eBay had a certification policy based on the “Powerseller” badge, which 
qualified sellers with at least 100 items or at least 1000 dollars worth of items every month 
for three consecutive months, in addition to the obligation to maintain at least 98% of 
positive feedbacks and 4.6 out of 5.0 detailed seller ratings.  
In September 2009 the “Top Rated Seller” badge became effective and replaced the 
“Powerseller” one. The new badge has more stringent certification requirements, in fact, 
to gain it a seller must have all the features required by the “Powerseller” and, 
additionally, it must have at least 100 transactions and sell at least 3000 dollars worth of 
items over the previous 12 months, it must have less than 0,5 % of transactions with a 
DSR lower than one star and it must have less than 0,5% of transactions with complaints 
from buyers.  
Let’s consider a simple model proposed by Hui et al. (2019), who studied the eBay policy 
change; in this model there is a continuum of sellers and each of them can produce with 
zero marginal costs and fixed costs 𝑘 ∈ [0, +∞). 
In this continuum, sellers are of three types: µ: (low-quality sellers), µ; (high-quality 
sellers), µ< (strategic sellers). The latter are sellers who can produce both medium quality 
(M) and high quality (H), but if they choose to produce high quality they have to exert an 
extra effort with a cost 𝑒. 
Each of a continuum of buyers demands one unit of good and it’s willing to pay up to the 
expected quality of the good, but they can’t observe the quality of any seller. 
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A marketplace regulator produces an observable badge B that denotes a quality between 
high and medium: 
 
 𝐵 ∈ {𝑀,𝐻}. 
Since prices depend on the quality and buyers can only ascertain if a seller is badged or 
not, strategic sellers will always choose to shirk and produce medium quality, that is 
comprised in the badge as high quality. The equilibrium prices in this setting are pE, 
which is the price that a badged seller can ask, and p:, that is the price that a non-badged 
seller can ask.  
Now we will introduce a change in the badge requirements, simulating the eBay change 
of September 2009.  
In our model, a more stringent badge means excluding medium quality from it, hence, the 
new badge will be:                               B = H. 
With this new badge, µ< sellers must exert effort e and produce high quality if they want 
to gain (or maintain) the certification. 
Now suppose that the price that a badged seller can ask is p;, and the price that a non-
badged seller can ask is p:; strategic sellers will choose to exert effort and produce high 
quality only if the costs of doing that are lower than p;. 
The cost function of µ< sellers is:    F = f(k, e) = k + e. 
Hence, strategic sellers will produce high quality if and only if:  p; > 𝑘 + 𝑒. 
The results of this model are that when B = H there exists a new equilibrium, with a price p; and a price p:. Market prices and cost functions of strategic sellers determine for each 
of them their choice to work.  
The model of Hui et al. (2019) shows also that, because p: < 𝑝O, strategic sellers who 
lost their badge are hurt facing a lower price (before the change they were able to ask pE 
with the same effort), and those with high enough entry and effort costs will not enter the 
market after the change. Another evidence is that now unbadged sellers include both µ: 
and µE sellers (before the change they include only µ:), so the overall quality of unbadged 
sellers increases. 
In sum, the policy change, according to this model, will give benefits to high and low 
quality sellers: the former benefit from the ability to ask for a price p;, the latter benefit 
from being pooled with medium quality sellers, which probably means a price p: that 
might be slightly bigger than the price of non-badged sellers in the “lax badge” setting. 
As a direct consequence, market entry increases for low and high quality sellers and 
decreases for strategic sellers. 
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In their studies, Hui et al. (2019) used data from October 2008 to September 2010, which 
include all listings and transaction data on eBay in the year before and in the year after 
the policy change. To measure quality of sellers in their empirical analysis, the authors 
used a measure proposed by Nosko and Tadelis (2015): the EPP (Effective Percentage 
Positioning), which is the number of positive feedback transactions divided by the 
number of total transactions. Results of the studies of Hui et al. (2019) show that the 
policy change caused in all markets a decrease in the share of badged sellers, however, 
the entity of this decrease varies a lot across different markets, and in those markets that 
are more affected, the entrant ratio is bigger and the average quality of entrants too. 
Studying the quality distribution of entrants, the authors were able to demonstrate that 
after the policy change it exhibits “fatter tails”, which means that entrant ratio is higher 
for high and low quality sellers and exit ratio is bigger for medium quality sellers.  
Regarding the policy effect on prices, Hui et al. (2019) found evidence that overall prices 
increase for those sellers who were unbadged before the change and then remained 
unbadged (NN). Sellers who lost their badge after the policy change (BN) experienced a 
decrease in prices and sellers who maintain their badge (BB) or who were unbadged 
before the change but were able to gain the badge (NB) experienced a larger increase in 
prices than NN sellers.  
In conclusion, empirical studies of Hui et al. (2019) found confirmations to their theoretic 
model that predicted the effects of the policy change. 
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3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, I illustrated the most successful reputation mechanisms of online 
marketplaces and I discussed how they work to guarantee trust among users. As we can 
see from the various empirical studies that I collected in this work, online platforms have 
become a very interesting topic for the economic literature: platforms – on the one hand 
– have great economic value, and – on the other hand – suffer of specific issues which are 
actually affecting them and are difficult to solve for market designers. 
The study has been organized in 3 parts. In Part 1 I provided an overview of the 
information asymmetry problem, discussing both adverse selection and moral hazard. In 
Part 2, I showed how this problem affects online markets and how could be reduced 
through different mechanisms like eWOM, Rebate systems (like the one of Taobao) and 
certification policies. Indeed, eWOM acts as a repository of ratings left by buyers about 
a seller’s performance in its various transactions, with feedbacks concerning the purchase 
experience offered by the seller and reviews concerning the quality level of items sold. 
Trusted certification badges given by marketplaces are another mechanism that 
contributes to create a sort of seller reputation, therefore mitigating the first major 
problem of e-markets, that is information asymmetry. Certification policies are based on 
average ratings, hence they are a derivation of eWOM. 
The second major problem of online platforms is the one of rating biases. As I showed in 
section 2 of this paper, bias in ratings is a problem common to nearly all online 
marketplaces and it’s very difficult to solve, because it is due mainly to heterogeneity in 
the reviewers psychology and to online social influence. The latter is the phenomenon of 
people who imitate other people (seen as opinion leaders) in their rating phase. Rating 
biases’ more alarming problem is the fact that reviews and feedbacks may not correspond 
to the true consumers’ valuations about a product or a purchase experience. 
Another issue typical of the online platforms is the one of retaliation: normally, if a user 
leaves a negative feedback to another user, if possible, the latter will retaliate and rate 
negatively the former. We’ve seen that marketplace designers have been able to solve the 
retaliation problem through adopting a one sided feedback system instead of a two sided 
one. However, we also saw that one sided feedback systems are not optimal for all types 
of marketplaces. 
In the aim of allowing consumers to maintain at least part of their surplus, in what follows 
I discuss a set of rules that an antitrust authority can implement for online platforms. In 
this perspective, I present 8 points: 
 25 
- First, taking into account information asymmetry, an antitrust institution should 
state that eWOM, composed by feedbacks and reviews, must be incorporated to 
all online platforms. In fact it’s clear that eWOM is a fundamental tool to make 
consumers empowered agents and to make them able to form an idea about the 
reputation of a generic seller. 
- The feedback system should be one sided, unless the marketplace is a house-rental 
type or a marketplace with similar characteristics; this will guarantee that the 
problem of retaliation will be solved and users will be able to leave more true and 
less biased reviews.  
For house-rental markets like Airbnb, or marketplaces with similar characteristics, 
the system should be a two sided type. However, I think that there should be a 
customer service addressed to both lessors and renters, that can intervene in case 
of disputes for feedbacks that are supposed to be retaliatory by examining their 
textual content and the past reputation of the two parts: this customer service may 
alleviate the retaliation issue also in these particular platforms. 
- Following the Taobao path, I think that the Reward-for-feedback system should 
be adopted as a rule by all marketplaces, because of the great advantages in terms 
of reduction of information asymmetry that it provides, but also because it helps 
increasing the overall quality of the marketplace and helps new sellers to bypass 
the cold start problem. 
- To leave a feedback or a review, I think that should be compulsory that before 
rating a seller or a product, the buyer has to purchase something, to avoid the 
problem of fake reviews. 
- Regarding bias in ratings, we’ve seen that this problem is articulated in various 
forms.  
The first form is the one of early adopters enthusiasm: early adopters normally are 
very enthusiastic about a product, and therefore their reviews will be more 
positive than the one of late comers. The consequent downtrend of ratings hence 
is not justified by a concrete decrease in the item’s performance.  
The second form is the one of online social influence. Empirical evidence 
highlights the phenomenon of rating bubbles: reviewers tend to conform their 
opinion to the one of previous reviewers and this happens very often when the 
latter are seen as opinion leaders. I also showed in section 2 of this paper that 
online social influence affects consumers in different ways and with different 
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levels of pervasiveness, and this depends on the psychological characteristics of 
individuals.  
Though it’s not possible to eliminate bias in ratings, I think that an antitrust 
institution can design some rules to alleviate that problem. We’ve seen that early 
adopters enthusiasm impact more those markets where consumers are engaged at 
a more psychological level, like markets for books or tv series; therefore, for these 
markets, together with markets for which the valuations by consumers tend to be 
highly subjective (i.e. videogames, films, music…) should be treated separately 
and should embody only textual reviews. In the latters, people can give their 
subjective explanation for why they liked or not the product, without being 
obliged to leave a rating score. 
A rating score is much more impactful on peers valuation than the content itself 
of a review, because the former is a direct and easy way to express the valuation 
of an item, that can be copied without excessive effort, therefore it is more prone 
to work as a proxy to which the subsequent reviews may conform. 
With a system in which only the review content is showed, buyers, when browsing 
for reviews about, for example, a videogame, will see only textual reviews in 
which are listed, according to each reviewer, their thought about pros and cons of 
the item.  
The same treatment should be adopted also for niche markets: as showed by 
studies of Lee et al. (2015) when the product is a niche one, people tend to 
differentiate themselves from the crowd in the rating phase; I think that if reviews 
are free from rating scores, it will be more difficult for reviewers to imitate or 
differentiate themselves in respect to peers, driving them to post more truthful 
reviews.  
- As reported in paragraph 2.2.2, studies of Moe and Schweidel (2012) found out 
that individuals with extreme post purchase valuations are more likely to 
contribute with eWOM than those with moderate post purchase evaluations, and 
this is another reason for the problem of rating scores which are concentrated on 
extremely positive or negative values; in this case I think that the adoption of the 
Reward-for-feedback system, which I proposed to alleviate information 
asymmetry, can be very effective, giving more incentives to contribute with 
feedbacks and reviews also to those people who normally are less likely to 
contribute due to their moderate valuations. 
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In fact, as we already said, eWOM is a public good, and this implies that not all 
consumers are encouraged to provide it; maybe those that are more encouraged to 
post a feedback or a review are people who are very disappointed about their 
experience, or, o the other hand, are very enthusiastic. Those who have a moderate 
valuation of their purchase experience find no incentive to provide information to 
future buyers. Here comes the RFF system, that rewards people to supply that 
public good, encouraging also “moderate consumers”. 
- Regarding quality certifications given by platforms to sellers, as we’ve seen in 
paragraph 2.3 of this paper they can be a very effective tool to alleviate 
information asymmetry and to improve the quality of the marketplace. In fact, a 
certification badge is a very impactful signal of a seller’s reputation, that a generic 
buyer can always trust. The point here, for our antitrust institution, is to determine 
the quality threshold for each certification of each marketplace.  
Following the studies of Hui et al. (2019) on the eBay certification policy change 
of 2009, we’ve seen that setting a threshold that is a medium one is not the best 
practice, because sellers who offer medium quality take advantage of continuing 
to provide that medium quality; if we set the threshold at a higher quality level, 
for a medium quality seller it’s necessary to make more efforts and improve its 
quality to gain the badge and exploit all the advantages that it provides. 
- In line with the studies of Chu and Wu (2018) on Chinese online platforms 
designed for offline services (O2O), for example baby sitting, wedding planning 
or food delivery, I propose another point that our hypothetical Antitrust authority 
can include in its regulation for e-markets. Chu and Wu (2018) showed that, in 
China, O2O platforms are characterized by a fierce competition because of the 
excessive number of sellers; for this reason it is probable that firms will tend to 
concentrate on the short time period: service providers may shirk in early 
transactions, producing a quality level which is not the one they advertised, to 
achieve faster the reputation level they need to be competitive and to not being 
pulled out of the market. 
The authors present a model in which the platform restricts the number of service 
providers below a certain threshold, excluding those which deliver low quality 
outcomes to consumers (quality of outcomes is measured through eWOM): they 
found out that doing so can improve the overall quality offered on the platform, 
making competition more lax than in the setting in which the number of providers 
is unlimited. So, another point of my hypothetical regulation is that, if the market 
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is characterized by a severe competition, to protect consumer surplus and improve 
the quality of items traded online platforms should set a restriction on the number 
of sellers, excluding those sellers who, according to reviews and feedbacks left 
buy buyers, are low-quality sellers.  
In conclusion, these are my ideas about how an antitrust authority should “regulate” 
online marketplaces; indeed, such new markets should be designed to guarantee trust 
among their users. I know that the problem of rating biases is not yet solved even with 
those hypothetical rules that I proposed in this paragraph, but the information asymmetry 
problem is very much reduced and eWOM has had the greater role in this process. 
Changing the behaviour of consumers and making them more powerful and comfortable 
when comparing the products that the market offers to them, eWOM has created the need 
for sellers to differentiate themselves, improve their quality and delight customers.  
Competition among online marketplaces is an evolving phenomena, and new research 
should be addressed to investigate it, in particular considering consumer surplus and the 
role of Antitrust Authorities in protecting it.  
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